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Although the perceptual load theory of attention has stimulated a great deal of research, evidence for the
role of perceptual load in determining perception has typically relied on indirect measures that infer
perception from distractor effects on reaction times or neural activity (see N. Lavie, 2005, for a review).
Here we varied the level of perceptual load in a letter-search task and assessed its effect on the conscious
perception of a search-irrelevant shape stimulus appearing in the periphery, using a direct measure of
awareness (present/absent reports). Detection sensitivity (d) was consistently reduced with high, com-
pared to low, perceptual load but was unaffected by the level of working memory load. Because
alternative accounts in terms of expectation, memory, response bias, and goal-neglect due to the more
strenuous high load task were ruled out, these experiments clearly demonstrate that high perceptual load
determines conscious perception, impairing the ability to merely detect the presence of a stimulus—a
phenomenon of load induced blindness.
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To what extent does conscious perception depend on attention?
This question has intrigued psychologists for several decades and
has led to a long-standing debate between early and late selection
views of attention. According to the early selection view, percep-
tion is a limited capacity process and therefore depends on the
allocation of attention (Broadbent, 1958; Treisman, 1960, 1969).
According to the late selection view, perception has unlimited
capacity and proceeds automatically, independent of attention
(e.g., Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963; Driver & Tipper, 1989; Norman,
1968; Tipper, 1985).
Initial attention studies employing the dichotic listening or se-
lective looking paradigms reported that unattended stimuli fre-
quently went unnoticed (e.g., Cherry, 1953; Moray, 1959; Neisser
& Becklen, 1975; Rock & Gutman, 1981; see Lavie, 2006, for a
review). These findings suggest that conscious perception depends
on the allocation of attention, in line with the early selection view.
However, since these findings were typically obtained in experi-
ments assessing retrospective reports, they were criticized as
merely reflecting memory failures (e.g., Deutsch & Deutsch,
1963). Online measures of perception in the dichotic listening
paradigm, such as assessing the effects of the semantic content of
unattended information on the speed of shadowing (e.g., Lewis,
1970) or on skin conductance (e.g., Corteen & Dunn, 1974), or
assessing distractor identity effects on the speed of target classi-
fication responses (e.g., Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Gatti & Egeth,
1978), are not subject to the memory criticism and have produced
evidence that unattended information is perceived, in line with the
late selection view.
The discrepancy between these contrasting sets of results cannot
be resolved in terms of differences arising due to the use of online
and offline retrospective measures of perception, however, be-
cause some experiments employing online measures of perception
have supported the early selection view. For example, Treisman
and Geffen (1967; see also Treisman & Riley, 1969) found that
when awareness reports of targets occurring in either channel (both
attended and unattended) were assessed online in the dichotic
listening paradigm, very few targets occurring in the unattended
channel were reported, whereas most of those in the attended
channel were. Conflicting results were even found between exper-
iments using the same measure of distractor processing. For ex-
ample, whereas Eriksen and Eriksen (1974) found evidence for
unattended distractor perception using the response competition
paradigm (thus providing support for the late selection view),
Eriksen and Hoffman (1972), and later Yantis and Johnston
(1990), used the same measure of response competition effects as
that used by Eriksen and Eriksen and found no evidence for
perception of the unattended distractors (e.g., those presented
outside of the putative region of the attentional spotlight in Eriksen
& Hoffman, 1972), thus supporting the early selection view.
These inconsistencies in the attention literature have led some to
doubt that the early versus late selection debate can ever be
resolved (e.g., Allport, 1993). However, a resolution has been
proposed in the form of a hybrid of early and late selection views:
the perceptual load model of attention (Lavie, 1995, 2000; Lavie,
Hirst, De Fockert, & Viding, 2004; Lavie & Tsal, 1994). Lavie
proposed that the level of perceptual load imposed by a task
dictates whether early or late selection will occur. In her model,
perception has a limited capacity (as with the early selection view)
but proceeds automatically on all stimuli (as per late selection),
whether relevant to the task at hand or not, until all capacity is
consumed. This model leads to the prediction that task-irrelevant
stimuli will not be perceived (early selection) when the task
processing requirements involve a high level of perceptual load
that consumes all available attentional capacity. By contrast, when
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load, any spare attentional capacity will spill over involuntarily,
resulting in the perception of irrelevant stimuli (late selection).
A review of the early and late selection studies of visual atten-
tion provided support for these predictions (Lavie & Tsal, 1994).
The tasks used in the studies that provided support for the late
selection view typically carried a low level of perceptual load—for
example, requiring the identification of just one target stimulus
(e.g., Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974)—whereas the tasks that provided
support for the early selection view typically involved a high level
of perceptual load—for example, requiring search for a target
among six items or more (Eriksen & Hoffman, 1972; Yantis &
Johnston, 1990).
The predictions of perceptual load theory have also been sup-
ported by various behavioral and neuroimaging studies, as we
briefly review below (see Lavie, 2005, for a more detailed review).
Lavie and colleagues (Lavie, 1995, 2000; Lavie & Cox, 1997;
Lavie & Fox, 2000) have demonstrated that response competition
and negative priming effects on target reaction times (RTs) from
irrelevant distractors can be found, as long as the task involves a
low level of perceptual load (e.g., with a search display of just one
item or with a simple feature detection task). Such effects are
eliminated, however, when the task imposes a high level of per-
ceptual load (e.g., with a search display of six items or with a task
requiring a complex feature-conjunction discrimination). These
findings have been replicated with meaningful 3D objects as
distractors (Lavie, Ro, & Russell, 2003) and with distractors pre-
sented directly at fixation (Beck & Lavie, 2005).
Functional imaging studies investigating perceptual load theory
have demonstrated that visual cortex activity related to the pres-
ence of task-irrelevant stimuli (e.g., V5/MT activity related to
motion, parahippocampal activity related to images of places, and
activity in retinotopic cortex related to the presence of flickering
checkerboards) is attenuated under high perceptual load (e.g.,
Bahrami, Lavie, & Rees, 2007; O’Connor, Fukui, Pinsk, & Kast-
ner, 2002; Pinsk, Doniger, & Kastner, 2003; Rees, Frith, & Lavie,
1997; Schwartz et al., 2005; Yi, Woodman, Widders, Marois, &
Chun, 2004). Indeed, typically the neural signature of the irrele-
vant stimulus is eliminated entirely with high perceptual load.
However, despite the focus of the theory on the extent to which
task-irrelevant stimuli are perceived, in all these studies the con-
clusions are based upon indirect measures, such as effects on target
RTs or neural activity. Therefore, although these studies demon-
strate that the degree to which task-irrelevant stimuli are success-
fully ignored is determined by the level of perceptual load of the
task, in support of load theory and the resolution of the early and
late selection debate that it proposes, they do not provide any direct
evidence to support the claim that perceptual load determines
whether task-irrelevant stimuli are consciously perceived.
Specifically, the effects of perceptual load on the neural activity
related to task-irrelevant stimuli cannot support any direct conclu-
sions about conscious perceptual experience. Indeed Bahrami,
Lavie, and Rees (2007) recently showed that perceptual load can
modulate V1 activity related to an invisible irrelevant stimulus that
the participants did not consciously perceive. Furthermore, the
measures of distractor effects on target RTs in the behavioral
experiments, despite their prevalent use as an index of distractor
processing in much of the early and late selection research, cannot
support any direct conclusions about conscious perception, since
one cannot deduce whether a participant was or was not conscious
of the distractors on the basis of their RT to the target.
Indeed, the RT results can be construed either way. If the
participants were not conscious of the distractors, then their effects
on target RTs under conditions of low perceptual load can be
explained by unconscious processing of stimulus–response asso-
ciations. Conversely, if the participants were conscious of the
distractors, the elimination of the distractor effects on target RTs
under high perceptual load could be the result of post–perceptual
response selection processes, although the argument that RT ef-
fects may have simply dissipated during the longer RTs in high
load tasks is ruled out by the fact that distractor effects tend to
increase rather than decrease with manipulations that increase task
difficulty, and consequently RTs, without increasing perceptual
load (for example, with manipulations of working memory load
[Lavie, 2000; Lavie et al., 2004] or with manipulations that induce
sensory limits rather than resource limits, e.g., involving extreme
stimulus degradation that makes the target stimulus barely visible
[Lavie & De Fockert, 2003]). While this body of research therefore
provides convincing evidence that perceptual load determines the
level of neural activity related to task-irrelevant stimuli and the
extent to which distractors interfere with task performance, it is
mute with regard to the question of whether the conscious percep-
tion of task-irrelevant stimuli is affected by perceptual load.
Only one study so far has investigated perceptual load while
measuring participants’ conscious perception of task-irrelevant
stimuli. Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2007) recently tested the
effect of perceptual load on awareness with the inattentional blind-
ness paradigm. In a series of experiments, they found that the
number of participants who reported being aware of a task-
irrelevant stimulus presented unexpectedly on the last trial was
strongly dependent on the level of perceptual load of the task
performed. The rate of awareness reports was considerably lower
(typically around 40%–50% lower) in tasks of high perceptual load
(involving either attention-demanding subtle perceptual discrimi-
nations or visual search for a letter among similar nontarget letters)
than in tasks of low perceptual load (involving either simple color
detection or visual search for a letter among very dissimilar non-
target letters). This study conclusively demonstrated that high
perceptual load is far more likely than low perceptual load to
produce inattentional blindness.
Inattentional blindness, however, may not necessarily reflect a
lack of conscious perception. The retrospective measure of aware-
ness used in this paradigm is taken after a task response and a
surprise question, and so may well involve effects of rapid forget-
ting (Wolfe, 1999). Also, since both the presence of the extra
stimulus and its physical appearance (e.g., color, shape, and loca-
tion) are unexpected, it is possible that the extra stimulus is
perceived but generates only a weak signal (see Barber & Folkard,
1972; Bashinski & Bacharach, 1980; Davis, Kramer, & Graham,
1983; Teichner & Krebs, 1974, for demonstrations of the effects of
expectations on detection) that is easily wiped out of memory with
the delay incurred by the task response and the processing of the
surprise question. The effect of perceptual load on the likelihood of
a participant’s reporting awareness in the inattentional blindness
paradigm may then, at least in part, reflect reduced encoding of the
stimulus into memory instead of, or in addition to, reduced per-
ception.
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perceptual load on conscious perception in a modified inattentional
blindness paradigm in which an expected “critical” stimulus (CS)
was presented in multiple trials. The participants were shown
examples of this stimulus before starting the experiment, so that its
appearance was known in advance. Conscious perception of the
CS was measured online, with responses occurring straight after
the task response or even immediately upon presentation (i.e.,
before the task response; see Experiment 3). Previously with the
inattentional blindness paradigm there was no way to assess de-
tection sensitivity, as the extra stimulus was presented only once
per participant. Because here the CS was presented multiple times,
the effects of perceptual load on detection sensitivity (d) and
response bias () could be assessed. It follows directly from
perceptual load theory that detection sensitivity will be reduced
under conditions of high perceptual load, but response bias will be
unaffected. Although this prediction is at the core of perceptual
load theory it has not, as yet, been tested.
In addition, with the following experiments we also examined
the specificity of the effect of perceptual load by addressing
alternative accounts in terms of memory (Experiments 2 and 3),
response prioritization or goal neglect (Experiment 4), strategy
(Experiment 5), and general cognitive capacity limits (involving
other processes such as working memory) as opposed to specific
capacity limits in perception (Experiment 6).
Experiment 1
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to examine whether the
perceptual load of a visual search task would determine the sen-
sitivity of conscious detection of an extra stimulus that was irrel-
evant to the task. Participants were presented with a circle of letters
on each trial and were asked to search for either of the target letters
X or N. They were also asked to detect a small, meaningless gray
figure (the CS) that was presented outside of the letter circle.
Example trials with the CS presented were shown at the start of the
experiment. Perceptual load was manipulated by varying the sim-
ilarity between targets and nontargets in the circle of letters (e.g.,
Lavie & Cox, 1997). In the high perceptual load condition the
nontarget letters were H, K, M, W, and Z, and in the low perceptual
load condition they were all Os and were smaller than the target
letter. The experimental blocks were followed by a control block
of trials in which the participants were asked to not perform the
letter search task and just detect the CS. The search displays were
the same as those in the experimental blocks. Any participant with
a CS detection rate of lower than 75% in the control block was
excluded.
Method
Participants. Sixteen participants were recruited at University
College London (UCL) and were paid for their participation. One
participant was excluded and replaced because he detected less
than 75% of the CS in the control block. The age range of those
included was 18 to 34 years (M  24.9, SD  4.4), and there were
7 men. All of the participants in this experiment, as well as those
in subsequent experiments, had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and were naı ¨ve to the purposes of the experiment.
Apparatus and stimuli. The experiments were created and run
with E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., 2003) on an IBM
compatible PC attached to a Sony 15“ monitor. A viewing distance
of 57 cm was maintained with a chin rest throughout the experi-
ment. Six letters were presented, equally spaced (nearest contours
0.95° apart), in a circle of 1.7° radius that was centered at fixation.
The background of the display was mid-gray (red/green/blue
[RGB] values: 204, 204, 204), the CS was a darker gray (RGB
values: 153, 153, 153), and the letters were black. For a mask, a
black mesh pattern covered the whole screen except for a square
(9.5° by 9.5°) in the center so as not to mask the circle of letters.
The target letter, a capital letter X or N (0.6°  0.6°), each equally
likely, appeared at random but with equal probability at one of the
six letter locations. The remaining five locations were occupied in
the low perceptual load condition by smaller letter Os (0.2°  0.2°
wide) and in the high perceptual load condition by the letters H, K,
M, W, and Z (of the same size as the target letter). The CS, a gray
meaningless shape (0.3°  0.3°), was presented at one of six
equally spaced locations arranged in a circle of radius 5.4°. Each
CS location lay on an imaginary line that passed through the
fixation point and bisected two adjacent letter locations (see Figure
1 for an example display).
The combinations of target letter location and CS location were
counterbalanced, so that for each target letter location the CS was
presented once in each of four locations, the two nearest locations
to the target letter (one on either side) and the two farthest
locations. The stimuli were presented in two blocks of 72 trials
with the CS presented in 12 randomly selected trials per block
(17%). It appeared twice in each of the six locations forming the
circle, consisting of, for each target location, once in one of the two
near-target letter locations (and in the other near location in the
other block) and once in one of the two far locations (and in the
other far location in the other block). A counterbalanced set of 144
different stimulus displays consisted of each of the target letters
(two: X or N) in each of the letter circle locations (six), either
without or with the CS in each location (six), and its location
relative to the target (two: near or far). In the high perceptual load
condition there were also 144 randomly selected nontarget ar-
rangements. The control block used half of the displays from the
first experimental block and half from the second, such that the CS
still appeared twice at each of the six locations.
Procedure. A fixation dot was presented at the center of the
screen for1sa tt h estart of each trial, followed by the search task
display for 100 ms (which included the CS in 17% of the trials). A
mask was then presented for 500 ms and subsequently a blank
Figure 1. Example of the stimulus display used in the high perceptual
load condition.
1080 MACDONALD AND LAVIEscreen that lasted for 1.4 s (making a total of 2 s during which
participants could make the search task response). A display with
a question mark at the center was presented next for 100 ms. The
participants were instructed to make the CS detection response
upon the presentation of this question mark. This was followed by
a blank screen for 1.9 s (making a total of 2 s during which
participants could make the CS detection response). Both 2-s time
windows elapsed regardless of whether a response was made or
not made. Participants were instructed to make their search re-
sponse as quickly and as accurately as possible and to indicate
detection of the CS immediately following the presentation of the
question mark. Participants pressed the 0 key with their thumb for
the target X, and the 2 key with their forefinger for the target N,
using the numeric key pad with their right hand. Detection of the
CS was indicated by pressing the S key with the forefinger of the
left hand. If no response or an incorrect response to the search task
was made, a “beep” was heard at the end of each trial. There was
no feedback for CS detection.
Before starting the experiment, the participants were shown nine
example trials with no CS, followed by six example trials with the
CS. During each of these the participant confirmed verbally
whether he or she had seen the CS or not, and they were repeated
for participants who failed to see the CS at least three times. Each
participant then completed two experimental blocks of 72 trials,
both of the same level of perceptual load (low for half of the
participants, high for the other half), followed by a control block of
72 trials (including 12 CS trials), in which participants were
instructed to respond to the presence of the CS but to ignore the
circle of letters.
Results and Discussion
Letter search. Trials in which the search response was incor-
rect and those in which RT was greater than 1.5 s were excluded
from the RT analyses in all of the experiments reported. One-way
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) on mean search RT and mean
search error rate in the low and high perceptual load conditions
revealed that search RTs were significantly longer in the high
perceptual load condition (M  766 ms) than in the low perceptual
load condition (M  593 ms), F(1, 14)  8.68, MSE  13,742.09,
p  .011, p
2  .383 (two tailed, as is every statistical test in this
article), and search error rates in the high perceptual load condition
(M  11%) were significantly higher than in the low perceptual
load condition (M  3%), F(1, 14)  58.27, MSE  3.99, p 
.001, p
2  .806. These results confirm that the perceptual load
manipulation was effective.
CS detection. Mean percentage detection rate and false alarm
rate, as well as mean d were calculated, excluding trials in which
the search response was incorrect. These are shown as a function
of perceptual load in Table 1. One-way ANOVAs on these mea-
sures as a function of perceptual load indicated that detection rates
were significantly lower in the high perceptual load condition than
in the low perceptual load condition, F(1, 14)  15.06, MSE 
756.46, p  .002, p
2  .518. Mean d in the high perceptual load
condition was also significantly lower than that in the low percep-
tual load condition, F(1, 14)  15.44, MSE  1.50, p  .002, p
2 
.524.
Response criterion () was not significantly different between
the low load (M  5.5) and high load (M  9.0) conditions,
F  1.
There was no effect of the distance between the letter search
target and the CS. Mean hit rate was 61% for near and 64% for far
target-to-CS distance conditions, F(1, 14)  1.42, MSE  96.13,
p  .254, p
2  .092, and there was no interaction of load and
distance, F  1. There were no effects of distance in the rest of the
experiments either (p  .19 in all comparisons of detection rates
in the far and near target-to-CS distance conditions). The remain-
der of the results are therefore reported collapsed across distance
conditions.
Since the search task error rate was higher in the high perceptual
load condition than in the low load condition, there were more
critical trials excluded from the analysis in the high load condition
(M  17% excluded) than from the low load condition (M  4%
excluded). However, even when the incorrect search task trials
were included in the analysis, detection rate and d were still
significantly lower in the high perceptual load condition (M de-
tection rate  37%; Md 1.31) than in the low perceptual load
condition (M detection rate  90%; Md 3.68), F(1, 14) 
14.00, MSE  795.11, p  .002, p
2  .500, and F(1, 14)  11.90,
MSE  1.89, p  .004, p
2  .460 for detection rates and d,
respectively.
In addition, to address possible carryover effects from a search
task error on CS detection in the next trial, we reanalyzed the data,
excluding any trial that immediately followed an incorrect search
task trial, as well the incorrect search task trials themselves. The
results remained unchanged: Detection rates and d were very
similar to those obtained in the main analysis (see Table 1), M
detection rate  37%, Md 1.36 for the high perceptual load
condition; M detection rate  91%, Md 3.73 for the low
perceptual load condition, F(1, 14)  15.37, MSE  734.42, p 
.002, p
2  .523 for the effect of load on detection rates, and F(1,
14)  18.24, MSE  1.24, p  .001, p
2  .566 for the effect of
load on d. Thus, the reduction in detection sensitivity in the high
load condition was not caused by carryover effects from the larger
number of search task errors in that condition.
CS detection performance in the control block, during which
participants did not perform the letter search task, was equivalent
in the low (M detection rate  95%; Md 3.36) and high (M
detection rate  98%; Md 3.23) perceptual load conditions,
F(1, 14)  1.14, MSE  36.96, p  .303, p
2  .075 for detection
rates, F  1 for d. Clearly, the reduction in detection rate and
sensitivity found with the high, compared with low, perceptual
load experimental blocks was related to the actual performance of
the search task, rather than the differences between the appearance
of the displays in the load conditions.
Table 1
Experiment 1: Mean Percentage Detection Rate and False
Alarm Rate and Mean d for Critical Stimulus Detection as a
Function of Perceptual Load
Perceptual
load
Detection
rate (%)
False alarm
rate (%) d
Low 90 2 3.7
High 37 8 1.3
1081 LOAD INDUCED BLINDNESSThese findings provide preliminary evidence for the hypothesis
that the level of perceptual load in a task dictates whether any
additional stimuli unrelated to the search task can be consciously
detected.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, the manipulation of perceptual load was val-
idated by the fact that the search task RTs in the high load
condition were longer than those in the low load condition. How-
ever, because in Experiment 1 the time interval for the search
response always elapsed (regardless of when the response was
made), there would have been less time remaining following the
search response before the detection response was made in the
high load condition. It is therefore possible that decision and
response preparation processes related to CS detection were at a
disadvantage in the high perceptual load condition, and this may
have produced the reduction in detection rate and sensitivity. To
rule out this possibility, it was necessary to assess the effect of
perceptual load on CS detection in a design in which the RT for the
letter search task was equal in the low and high perceptual load
conditions, so that the interval of time between the search response
and the detection response would also be equal.
In Experiment 2, therefore, the participants were forced to wait
for 2 s after the presentation of the stimuli before responding to the
search task. We anticipated that this delay would equate search
task RTs in the low load and high load conditions. Unless the
effect of perceptual load was due to the shorter time available in
the high load condition to prepare for the detection response, the
results of Experiment 2 should replicate those of Experiment 1.
Method
Participants. Sixteen new participants were recruited from
UCL. One participant was replaced because her accuracy on the
letter search task was lower than 65%; another 3 were replaced
because they detected less than 75% of the CS in the control block;
and another 1 was replaced because his mean letter search RT (787
ms) was over two standard deviations above the group mean (337
ms). The age range of those included was 19 to 28 years (M  23.5
years, SD  3.3 years), and there were 4 men.
Stimuli and procedure. The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure
were the same as Experiment 1 except that the participants were
instructed to make their response to the letter search task 2 s after
stimulus presentation, at which point X/N? was presented for 100
ms. This was followed by a 1.9-s blank screen, during which time
the participants made their search response. Immediately following
the search response, a question mark was presented for 100 ms,
indicating that the detection response could now be made. Partic-
ipants were allowed2st omake the CS detection response, and the
next trial began either after their response or after the2sh a d
elapsed.
Results and Discussion
Letter search. As predicted, with the 2-s delay of the search
response there was no longer a difference in search RTs between
the high (M  337 ms) and the low (M  335 ms) perceptual load
conditions, F  1. The error rate in the high perceptual load
condition (M  21%) was, nevertheless, significantly higher than
in the low perceptual load condition (M  3%), F(1, 14)  31.38,
MSE  39.60, p  .001, p
2  .691, demonstrating that despite the
equal mean RT, perceptual load was again successfully increased
with the manipulation of search set size.
CS detection. Mean percentage detection and false alarm rates,
and mean d for correct search trials only as a function of percep-
tual load are presented in Table 2. As can be seen in the table,
detection rates and d were again significantly lower in the high
load condition, F(1, 14)  6.53, MSE  883.98, p  .023, p
2 
.318, and F(1, 14)  7.16, MSE  1.61, p  .018, p
2  .338 for
detection rates and d, respectively. Response criterion () was not
significantly different between the low load (M  6.9) and high
load (M  7.3) conditions, F  1.
The results were unchanged when reanalyzed with the incorrect
search task trials included (low load: M detection rate  85%, M
d3.52; high load: M detection rate  50%, Md 1.95), F(1,
14)  5.67, MSE  876.25, p  .032, p
2  .288, and F(1, 14) 
6.14, MSE  1.61, p  .027, p
2  .305 for detection rates and d,
respectively, and when both incorrect search task trials and any
trial immediately following an incorrect search task trial were
excluded (low load: M detection rate  86%, Md 3.56; high
load: M detection rate  51%, Md 1.94), F(1, 14)  5.75,
MSE  876.91, p  .031, p
2  .291, and F(1, 14)  6.67, MSE 
1.56, p  .022, p
2  .323 for the load effect on detection rates and
d, respectively.
CS detection in the control block was equivalent in the low
perceptual load condition (M detection rate  97%, Md 3.72)
and the high perceptual load condition (M detection rate  94%,
Md 3.49), F  1 for both detection rates and d, showing that
the CS was easily and equally detected in both load conditions
when there was no search task to perform.
Overall then, the results of Experiment 2 rule out an alternative
account of the poorer CS detection in the high load condition in
terms of there being less time available for decision making and
preparation of the CS detection response in that condition than in
the low load condition.
Experiment 3
Equating the time available for preparation of the detection
response in Experiment 2 ruled out most of the potentially con-
founding effects of differential search task RTs in the low and high
load conditions. However, since the detection response in Exper-
iments 1 and 2 was made after the search task response, an account
of the results in terms of a memory failure remains possible:
Although the same time interval elapsed between the presentation
of the stimuli and the detection response in the low and high
Table 2
Experiment 2: Mean Percentage Detection Rate and False
Alarm Rate and Mean d for Critical Stimulus Detection as a
Function of Perceptual Load
Perceptual
load
Detection
rate (%)
False alarm
rate (%) d
Low 86 2 3.53
High 48 5 1.84
1082 MACDONALD AND LAVIEperceptual load conditions, the participants’ attention was more
engaged in processing the search task during that interval in the
high load condition than in the low load condition. This may have
reduced the depth of encoding of the CS into memory (where it
had to be retained until the CS response could be made) in the high
load condition relative to the low load condition. It is therefore
important to assess the effects of perceptual load on detection
sensitivity in a design in which participants are asked to make the
detection response immediately upon its presentation—that is,
before the search task response, rather than after it, as in the
previous experiments.
Method
Participants. Twenty-two new participants were recruited
from UCL. Two participants were replaced because their accuracy
on the letter search task was below 65%, and 2 because they
detected less than 75% of the CS in the control block. The age
range of those included was 18 to 39 years (M  21.4 years, SD 
5.2 years), and there were 10 men.
Stimuli and procedure. The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure
were the same as Experiment 1, except that the participants were
instructed to make the detection response first, as soon as they saw
it, and to respond to the letter search task afterward. If they did not
see the CS, they were to respond to the letter search task as quickly
and accurately as they could. A single 2.7-s interval was available
to make both responses.
Results and Discussion
Letter search. As the detection response was made before the
search response, trials in which the CS was presented were ex-
cluded from the search task RT analysis, because making a detec-
tion response before the search response would have greatly de-
layed the search task RT. The perceptual load manipulation was
again effective: Search task RTs were significantly longer in the
high perceptual load condition (M  766 ms) than in the low
perceptual load condition (M  640 ms), F(1, 20)  5.57, MSE 
15,728.47, p  .029, p
2  .218, and error rate in the high
perceptual load condition (M  21%) was significantly higher than
in the low perceptual load condition (M  6%), F(1, 20)  39.46,
MSE  31.36, p  .001, p
2  .664.
CS detection. Mean percentage detection and false alarm rates,
and mean d for correct search trials only as a function of percep-
tual load are presented in Table 3. As in the previous experiments,
detection rates and d were significantly lower in the high load
than in the low load condition, F(1, 20)  5.44, MSE  982.61,
p  .030, p
2  .214, and F(1, 20)  6.01, MSE  1.16, p  .024,
p
2  .231 for load effects on detection rates and d, respectively.
Response criterion () showed a numerical trend toward a more
stringent criterion in the high load condition (M  14.1) than in the
low load condition (M  7.7), but this was not significant, F(1,
20)  2.69, MSE  83.50, p  .117, p
2  .119.
The results were unchanged when reanalyzed with the incorrect
search task trials included (low load: M detection rate  72%, M
d3.13; high load: M detection rate  41%, Md 2.01), F(1,
20)  5.73, MSE  911.68, p  .027, p
2  .223, and F(1, 20) 
6.57, MSE  1.05, p  .019, p
2  .247 for detection rates and d,
respectively, and when both incorrect search task trials and any
trial immediately following an incorrect search task trial were
excluded (low load: M detection rate  72%, Md 3.09; high
load: M detection rate  43%, Md 2), F(1, 20)  4.84, MSE 
967.18, p  .040, p
2  .195, and F(1, 20)  5.89, MSE  1.11,
p  .025, p
2  .227 for load effects on detection rates and d,
respectively.
CS detection in the control block, where participants did not
perform the letter search task, was again equivalent in the low
perceptual load condition (M detection rate  98%, Md 3.65)
and the high perceptual load condition (M detection rate  96%,
Md 3.31), F  1 for the main effect of perceptual load on
detection rates, F(1, 20)  1.40, MSE  0.46, p  .250, p
2  .066
for the main effect of perceptual load on d, ruling out alternative
accounts in terms of the differences between the appearance of the
displays in the load conditions.
Experiment 3, therefore, replicated the perceptual load effect on
CS detection found in Experiments 1 and 2, even though the order
of responses was reversed so that the detection response came
before the search response. The fact that in this experiment par-
ticipants did not have to delay their detection response until after
they had made the search response rules out alternative accounts of
the results in terms of a perceptual load effect on memory rather
than on detection sensitivity. Furthermore, reversing the order of
responses so that the detection response came first did not have a
significant effect on the modulation by perceptual load: A com-
parison of the results of Experiments 1 and 3 with a between-
experiment ANOVA revealed no main effect of experiment, F 
1 for both detection rates and d, and no interaction of perceptual
load and experiment for both the mean detection rates, F(1, 34) 
1.28, MSE  889.49, p  .265, p
2  .036, and for mean d, F(1,
34)  2.92, MSE  1.30, p  .097, p
2  .079. This adds further
support to the hypothesis that the level of perceptual load in a task
determines conscious perception of stimuli unrelated to that task.
It is somewhat surprising that the overall mean detection rate in
this experiment (56%) was lower than in Experiment 1 (63%),
considering that the detection response was now prioritized by
being made first, before the search response. This may reflect that
a response switch-cost incurred when participants had to suppress
the more frequent, and therefore dominant, search response to
make way for the relatively infrequent detection response. Such a
cost could have resulted in participants failing to make a detection
response in some of the CS trials, and therefore may have reduced
the rate of CS detection in this experiment. It is important to note,
however, that as such failures of response inhibition are likely to
have had similar effects on detection in the low and high percep-
tual load conditions, such an effect cannot serve as an alternative
account of the effect of perceptual load on detection.
Table 3
Experiment 3: Mean Percentage Detection Rate and False
Alarm Rate and Mean d for Critical Stimulus Detection as a
Function of Perceptual Load
Perceptual
load
Detection
rate (%)
False alarm
rate (%) d
Low 72 2 3.10
High 41 1 1.98
1083 LOAD INDUCED BLINDNESSExperiment 4
In Experiment 3, alternative accounts of the results in terms of
memory failure were countered by having the detection response
first, before the search response, thereby eliminating the delay
between CS presentation and response. The somewhat unexpected
trend for a decrease in overall mean detection rate with the detec-
tion response made first indicates that there may have been a
response switching-cost, however. In Experiment 4, therefore, the
order of responses was restored to that of Experiments 1 and 2,
with the detection response following the search response.
In all the experiments so far the CS was presented in 17% of
trials and participants made a detection response only if they
had spotted the CS, and simply made no response if it was
absent. This may have increased the likelihood that detection
task performance suffered to some extent from some form of
“goal-neglect” (Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson, & Freer,
1996). In other words, people may have simply neglected to
respond to the detection task on some occasions, and this would
be more likely to occur when the search task was more demand-
ing, as in the high load condition.
There is some evidence against a simple form of such response-
neglect in the previous experiments, as the reduction in detection
rate in the high load condition was typically accompanied by a
higher rate of false alarms (and hence could not be accounted for
by an overall reduction in the rate of detection responses in the
high load condition). Nevertheless, to minimize any effects of an
overall deprioritization of the detection task, we presented the CS
in 50% of the trials in Experiment 4 and requested that participants
make a detection response (either present or absent) on every trial.
More frequent presentations of the CS should raise the priority of
the detection task, as participants’ expectations that a CS would
appear in any given trial would be greater.
Method
Participants. Sixteen new participants were recruited from
UCL. Five participants were replaced because their accuracy on
the letter search task was below 65%; another 4 were replaced
because they detected less than 75% of the CS in the control block;
and 2 were replaced because their mean search RT was two
standard deviations either above or below the group mean. The age
range of those included was 18 to 26 years (M  20.0 years, SD 
2.3 years), and there were 5 men.
Stimuli and procedure. The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure
were the same as in Experiment 2 except that the CS was presented
in 36 of the 72 trials (50%) per block. In each block the CS was
presented six times in each of its six possible positions. A fully
counterbalanced set of 144 different stimulus displays, employed
across two blocks of 72 trials, consisted of each of the target letters
(2) in each of the letter circle positions (6), either without or with
the CS in each position (6). In the high perceptual load condition
there were also 144 randomly selected nontarget arrangements.
The control block used half of the displays from the first block and
half from the second block. Participants were instructed to press
the A key when the CS was absent and the S key when it was
present.
Results and Discussion
Letter search. As in the previous experiments, longer search
RTs and a greater number of errors were found in the high
perceptual load condition (M  870 ms and M  24%) than in the
low perceptual load condition (M  533 ms and M  11%), F(1,
14)  64.69, MSE  7026.05, p  .001, p
2  .822 for the RTs,
and F(1, 14)  12.24, MSE  54.17, p  .004, p
2  .466 for the
error rates.
CS detection. The mean percentage detection and false alarm
rate and mean d for correct search task trials only as a function of
perceptual load are presented in Table 4. As can be seen in the
table, the effects of perceptual load on detection rates and d were
replicated in Experiment 4, F(1, 14)  15.32, MSE  208.34, p 
.002, p
2  .523 for detection rates, and F(1, 14)  19.58, MSE 
0.64, p  .001, p
2  .583 for d. Response criterion () did not
differ between the low load (M  2.2) and high load (M  3.5)
conditions, F  1.
The results were unchanged when reanalyzed with the incorrect
search task trials included (low load: M detection rate  91%, M
d3.28; high load: M detection rate  63%, Md 1.56), F(1,
14)  13.68, MSE  225.11, p  .002, p
2  .494, and F(1, 14) 
18.37, MSE  0.65, p  .001, p
2  .567, respectively, and when
both incorrect search task trials and any trial immediately follow-
ing an incorrect search task trial were excluded (low load: M
detection rate  93%, Md 3.34; high load: M detection rate 
68%, Md 1.89), F(1, 14)  13.54, MSE  171.99, p  .002,
p
2  .492, and F(1, 14)  15.64, MSE  0.54, p  .001, p
2 
.528 for the load effect on detection rates and d, respectively.
CS detection in the control block was again equivalent in the
low perceptual load condition (M detection rate  98%, Md 
3.97) and the high perceptual load condition (M detection rate 
97%, Md 3.69), F(1, 14)  1.00, MSE  5.06, p  .334, p
2 
.067 for the main effect of perceptual load on detection rates, and
F(1, 14)  1.93, MSE  0.15, p  .187, p
2  .121 for the main
effect of perceptual load on d, showing that the CS was easily and
equally detected in both load conditions when there was no letter
search task to perform.
These results clearly demonstrate that perceptual load deter-
mines conscious perception even when the CS has a considerably
higher probability, appearing in 50% of trials rather than 17% as in
the previous experiments, and when task priority is greater as
participants now respond to the detection task on every trial.
Experiment 5
The purpose of Experiment 5 was to determine whether the
effect of perceptual load on detection can be replicated in a design
Table 4
Experiment 4: Mean Percentage Detection Rate and False
Alarm Rate and Mean d for Critical Stimulus Detection as a
Function of Perceptual Load
Perceptual
load
Detection
rate (%)
False alarm
rate (%) d
Low 92 5 3.38
High 64 15 1.61
1084 MACDONALD AND LAVIEin which low and high perceptual load trials are randomly inter-
mixed within a block. A replication with such a design would
preclude alternative accounts of the results in terms of any poten-
tial differences in strategy employed by the participants in the two
conditions of perceptual load. This has been adopted in several
studies (Brand-D’Abrescia & Lavie, 2007; Cartwright-Finch &
Lavie, 2007; Lavie & Cox, 1997; Lavie & Fox, 2000; Theeuwes,
Kramer, & Belopolsky, 2004), each successfully ruling out differ-
ential strategies as an alternative explanation of the perceptual load
effect. As in Experiment 4, the probability of CS presentation was
50% for each condition of perceptual load, and the participants
made a detection response on every trial (either present or absent).
Method
Participants. Twenty-two new paid UCL participants were
recruited. Three participants were excluded and replaced because
their accuracy on the letter search task was lower than 65%, and 2
were replaced because they detected less than 75% of the CS in the
control block. The age range of those included was 18 to 25 years
(M  20.4 years, SD  1.7 years), and there were 13 men.
Stimuli and procedure. The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure
were the same as in Experiment 4 except that low and high
perceptual load trials were randomly intermixed within each block.
The CS was presented on 50% of trials as in Experiment 4, and
participants made the detection response (either present or absent)
upon the presentation of the word spot? The first time interval for
the search response elapsed regardless of whether a response was
made or not, whereas the second time interval for the detection
task terminated on response. A counterbalanced set of 144 differ-
ent stimulus displays, employed across two blocks of 72 trials,
consisted of each load condition (2), each of the target letters (2)
in each of the letter circle positions (6), either without or with the
CS in each position (6). In the high perceptual load condition there
were also 72 randomly selected nontarget arrangements. The con-
trol block used half of the displays from the first block and half
from the second block.
Results and Discussion
Letter search. As in the previous experiments, search RTs
were significantly longer (high load M  857 ms, low load M 
674 ms) and error rates significantly higher (high load M  21%,
low load M  6%) in the high perceptual load condition than in the
low perceptual load condition, F(1, 21)  199.96, MSE 
1844.82, p  .001, p
2  .905, and F(1, 21)  90.68, MSE 
28.29, p  .001, p
2  .812 for RTs and error rates, respectively.
Thus, perceptual load was successfully increased with the manip-
ulation of search set size randomly intermixed within blocks.
CS detection. Mean percentage detection and false alarm rates
and mean d for correct search trials only as a function of perceptual
load are presented in Table 5. As can be seen in the table, detection
rates and d were again significantly lower in the high load than in the
low load condition, F(1, 21)  4.61, MSE  145.89, p  .044, p
2 
.180, and F(1, 21)  4.65, MSE  0.17, p  .043, p
2  .181 for the
load effect on detection rates and d, respectively. Response criterion
() was not significantly different between the low load (M  1.8)
and high load (M  2.2) conditions, F  1.
The results were unchanged when reanalyzed with the incorrect
search task trials included (low load: M detection rate  85%, M
d2.59; high load: M detection rate  78%, Md 2.33), F(1,
21)  6.53, MSE  99.35, p  .018, p
2  .237, and F(1, 21) 
5.33, MSE  0.13, p  .031, p
2  .202 for detection rates and d,
respectively, and when both incorrect search task trials and any
trial immediately following an incorrect search task trial were
excluded (low load: M detection rate  89%, Md 2.79; high
load: M detection rate  80%, Md 2.48), F(1, 21)  5.42,
MSE  152.88, p  .030, p
2  .205, and F(1, 21)  6.62, MSE 
0.16, p  .018, p
2  .240 for load effects on detection rates and
d, respectively.
CS detection in the control block, in which participants did not
perform the letter search task, was again equivalent in the low (M
detection rate  92%, Md 3.46) and high (M detection rate 
92%, Md 3.72) perceptual load conditions, F  1 for the main
effect of perceptual load on detection rates, F(1, 21)  3.35,
MSE  0.23, p  .081, p
2  .138 for the main effect of perceptual
load on d.
Overall, the results of Experiment 5 replicated the effect of per-
ceptual load on detection with a design in which the level of load was
randomly intermixed within blocks. Since this design precludes any
strategy-based accounts of the results, the replication of the effect of
perceptual load in this experiment clearly indicates that the effect of
perceptual load on detection does not necessitate the adoption of any
particular strategy. This conclusion concurs with the previous dem-
onstrations that high perceptual load can eliminate distractor interfer-
ence effects (e.g., Brand-D’Abrescia, & Lavie, 2007; Lavie & Cox,
1997; Lavie & Fox, 2000; Theeuwes et al., 2004) and induce a greater
rate of inattentional blindness (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007), even
when low and high levels of perceptual load are randomly intermixed
within blocks.
The effect of perceptual load on detection in this experiment (a
reduction in d of 0.3) was, however, smaller than that of the
previous experiments. (Compare, for example, this reduction in d
of 0.3 with the reduction of 1.8 obtained in Experiment 4, which
had the most comparable procedure but used a blocked load
design.
1) This reduction in the effect of load in Experiment 5 may
indicate the contribution of a strategy component to the effect of
perceptual load in the previous experiments, or it may be due to
other factors involved in the change to an intermixed load design
in this experiment. First, because Experiment 5 had the same
number of trials in total as in each of the previous experiments (to
keep the same overall level of practice in the task), this meant that
1 Although the numerical trend suggests a reduction in the effect of load
between Experiments 4 and 5, this could not be ascertained statistically
because within-subjects (Experiment 5) and between-subjects (Experiment
4) manipulations of the same independent variable (load) cannot be entered
into a single ANOVA.
Table 5
Experiment 5: Mean Percentage Detection Rate and False
Alarm Rate and Mean d for Critical Stimulus Detection as a
Function of Perceptual Load
Perceptual
load
Detection
rate (%)
False alarm
rate (%) d
Low 87 13 2.70
High 79 10 2.43
1085 LOAD INDUCED BLINDNESSit had only half the number of trials per load condition compared
with the previous experiments. With the smaller number of trials
per condition of load, Experiment 5 had weaker power to detect
any load effect. Second, intermixing the levels of perceptual load
in a block provides a weaker manipulation of perceptual load as a
result of carryover effects from one level of load to the other. In
fact, it is likely that such carryover effects would increase the level
of load in the low perceptual load condition due to a lack of a full
“clear out” of perception from the high load trials. In line with
these suggestions, the effect of perceptual load on the search RTs
was indeed smaller in this experiment compared with that in
Experiment 4, and the reduction in this effect appears to be
specifically due to an increase in the search RTs in the low
perceptual load condition (M  674 ms) compared with Experi-
ment 4 (M  533 ms). (In the high perceptual load condition, the
mean RT was only 13 ms faster in Experiment 5 than in Experi-
ment 4.) Therefore, because the effect of perceptual load on the
search task was also smaller in this experiment, this may have been
responsible for the weaker effect on detection.
In conclusion, it is unclear whether the reduction in the effect of
perceptual load in Experiment 5 was due to its weaker power with
the reduced number of trials per condition or to carryover effects
weakening the effect of perceptual load on search performance and
thereby on detection as well, or whether this reduction in the
effects of load indicates a strategy component. We note that as
alternative accounts of the effects of perceptual load in terms of
strategy have been clearly ruled out when other measures of
distractor processing and awareness were used (e.g., Cartwright-
Finch & Lavie, 2007; Lavie & Cox, 1997), the contribution of
strategy that the present results may allude to appears to be specific
to the search plus detection task used here.
Experiment 6
So far we have focused on the effect of perceptual load on
conscious perception. An important dissociation in load theory is
between the effects of perceptual load and working memory load
on selective attention (Lavie, 2000; Lavie et al., 2004). Whereas
high perceptual load reduces distractor processing, high working
memory load increases distractor processing. This dissociation is
important as it highlights two different means of attentional con-
trol. The effects of perceptual load indicate a rather passive means
of attentional selection, whereby the irrelevant distractors are
simply not perceived when perceptual capacity is exhausted by
task processing under high perceptual load. The effects of working
memory load indicate a more active executive control role: Work-
ing memory actively maintains stimulus processing priorities in a
task, so when working memory is loaded with other task-unrelated
material during task performance, the processing of low priority,
task-irrelevant distractors is increased.
Evidence for this dissociation has come from studies demon-
strating that in contrast to the reduction in distractor effects found
with tasks of high perceptual load, high working memory load
increases distractor effects on both RTs (in the response competi-
tion and attentional capture paradigms, e.g., Lavie, 2000; Lavie &
De Fockert, 2005; Lavie et al., 2004) and neural activity (related to
irrelevant distractor faces in a Stroop-like paradigm; De Fockert,
Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001).
As with the vast majority of the research on perceptual load,
however, the behavioral evidence that working memory load in-
creases distractor processing is currently limited to indirect mea-
sures (e.g., distractor effects on target RTs) that cannot lead to any
definitive conclusions regarding conscious perception. In Experi-
ment 6, we therefore sought to examine the effects of working
memory load on the conscious perception of stimuli that are
irrelevant to the search task.
To this aim, we interleaved the visual search and detection task
with a working memory task similar to that used in previous
studies showing the effects of working memory load on distractor
processing (e.g., Lavie et al., 2004). A memory set of either one
digit (in the low working memory load condition) or six digits (in
the high working memory load condition) was presented at the
start of each trial, followed by the search and detection task.
Participants had to retain the digit(s) in working memory while
performing the search and detection task in order to judge whether
a probe digit presented at the end of the trial had been a member
of the memory set. The search task was always of low perceptual
load and was identical to that used in the previous experiments.
Method
Participants. Twelve new participants were recruited from
UCL. One participant was replaced because he detected less than
75% of the CS in the control block, and another was replaced
because his false alarm rate was 100% in the experimental blocks.
The age range of those included was 20 to 32 years (M  25.5
years, SD  4.1 years), and there were 4 men.
Stimuli and procedure. The stimuli and procedure for the
visual search and detection task were the same as those used in the
low perceptual load condition of Experiment 4. The stimuli for the
working memory task (as per Lavie, 2000; Lavie et al., 2004)
consisted of a memory set of either a single digit (low working
memory load) or six digits (high working memory load). The digits
for each memory set were selected at random from 0 to 9, and each
digit was equally likely to be present in the memory set of each
load condition. The order of the six digits in the memory set of the
high working memory load condition was random, with the con-
straint that no more than two digits were presented in sequential
order. The digits were black, subtended 0.7°  0.5°, and were
centered on the screen, in a row when there were six digits (high
load condition). The memory probe digit had the same color and
dimensions as the memory set digits and was also centered on the
screen. Whether a probe was or was not a member of the memory
set was equally likely and was counterbalanced with respect to CS
presence and position. In the high working memory load condition
the probe digit was equally likely to have been in any of the six
digit positions in the memory set. At the beginning of each trial, a
fixation dot was presented for 1 s followed by a 1-s presentation of
the memory set display. A mask consisting of a 4°  1.4° patch of
random noise (black and gray) occupying the same position as the
six digits was then presented for 500 ms, followed by a blank
screen (500 ms). The letter circle was then displayed (100 ms),
followed by a mask (500 ms) and then a blank screen (1.4 s),
during which time participants made their response to the search
task. Next, the word spot? (presented in black letters subtending
0.9°  0.7°) was presented until the CS detection response was
made (either present or absent, S or A key). The CS detection
1086 MACDONALD AND LAVIEresponse was followed by the presentation of the memory probe,
which remained on screen until participants made their memory
response. Participants used their left hand to press the S key if the
probe was present in the memory set, or the A key if it was absent.
Incorrect memory responses were followed by a beep (lower in
pitch than the beep given as feedback for the search task). In the
control block the participants were instructed to ignore the mem-
ory set and simply press A in response to all memory probes. Each
of the working memory load conditions was presented in a 72-trial
block consisting of a counterbalanced set of displays of stimuli,
with equal likelihood of each of the target letters (2), in each of the
letter circle positions (6), either without or with the CS in each
position (6). Half of the participants performed the low load block
first, and the other half performed the high load block first. The
control block used half of the trials from the low load block and
half from the high load block.
Results and Discussion
Working memory task. Longer RTs and a greater number of
errors in the high working memory load condition (M RT  1296
ms, M error rate  15%) than in the low working memory load
condition (M RT  1028 ms, M error rate  8%) confirmed that
the manipulation of working memory load by memory set size was
effective, F(1, 11)  17.93, MSE  24,116.41, p  .001, p
2 
.620 for the RTs, F(1, 11)  8.24, MSE  33.99, p  .015, p
2 
.428 for the error rates.
Letter search. RTs and error rates on the search task were no
different in the high working memory load condition (M RT  848
ms, M error rate  3%) and the low working memory load
condition (M RT  842 ms, M error rate  5%), F  1 for the
RTs, and F(1, 11)  1.17, MSE  11.59, p  .304, p
2  .096 for
the error rates. This has often been the case in previous working
memory load studies: Working memory load typically has a se-
lective effect on distractor processing with no general increase in
overall RTs and error rates in the main task (e.g., Lavie et al.,
2004).
CS detection. Trials in which either the search response or the
working memory response were incorrect were excluded from the
analysis. Table 6 shows mean percentage detection and false alarm
rates and mean d as a function of working memory load. As can
be seen in the table, detection rate and d were no different in the
high and low working memory load conditions, F  1 for load
effects on both detection rates and d. Response criterion () was
also the same in the low working memory load (M  0.9) and high
working memory load (M  0.9) conditions, F  1.
The results were unchanged when reanalyzed with both the
incorrect search task trials and incorrect working memory task
trials included (low load: M detection rate  91%, Md 3.07;
high load: M detection rate  89%, Md 3.04; F  1 for both)
and when any trial following an incorrect search task trial was
excluded as well as the incorrect search task trials themselves (low
load: M detection rate  91%, Md 3.13; high load: M detection
rate  89%, Md 3.10), F(1, 11)  1.40, MSE  20.08, p 
.261, p
2  .113, and F  1, for detection rates and d, respectively.
In the control block, in which participants did not perform the
letter search task or working memory task, there was also no
difference between the low working memory load (M detection
rate  97%, Md 3.53) and high working memory load
conditions (M detection rate  96%, Md 3.31), F  1 for
detection rate, and F(1, 11)  1.93, MSE  0.15, p  .193, p
2 
.149 for d, as expected.
Thus, in contrast with the consistent reduction in the detection
rate and sensitivity of detection with high, compared with low,
perceptual load in Experiments 1 through 5, Experiment 6 dem-
onstrated that detection is unaffected by working memory load.
This finding is important in two respects. First, the contrast be-
tween the effect of perceptual load and the null effect of working
memory load rules out an alternative interpretation of the reduction
of detection sensitivity under high perceptual load in terms of
general task difficulty (see Lavie & De Fockert, 2003, for further
support for this claim) and strengthens the claim that the effect of
perceptual load on conscious awareness is specifically due to
increased demand on attentional capacity, rather than increased
demand on some general cognitive capacity resource.
Second, the contrast between our finding that the conscious
perception of a search-unrelated stimulus is unaffected by working
memory load and the previous findings that working memory load
increases distractor interference effects on RT as well as distractor-
related neural activity (Lavie, 2000; Lavie & De Fockert, 2005;
Lavie et al., 2004) provides an important clarification of the role
working memory serves in the control of selective attention.
2 The
critical stimulus used here was a low contrast meaningless shape
that could not compete with the search target for selection, because
it was unrelated to the search task responses and was less visually
salient than the target. By contrast, increased distractor interfer-
ence with high working memory load has been found in previous
studies (De Fockert et al., 2001; Lavie, 2000; Lavie & De Fockert,
2005; Lavie et al., 2004) with distractor stimuli that were strong
competitors for target selection, either because they were response
related (i.e., congruent or incongruent with the task response, as in
Lavie, 2000, and Lavie et al., 2004) or because they were more
visually salient than the target (i.e., in the attentional capture
paradigm used by Lavie & De Fockert, 2005, the distractor was a
color singleton presented during a shape search task), or in some
2 The contrast in susceptibility to the effects of working memory load
between noninterfering task-unrelated stimuli and distracting stimuli was
also directly established in another experiment (Macdonald, 2008). In this
experiment, when stimulus displays were used that were similar to those of
Experiment 6, but either the CS was presented (in some of the blocks) or
a distractor letter that was congruent or incongruent with the target was
presented (in the other blocks), working memory load significantly in-
creased distractor interference effects but again had no effect on CS
detection.
Table 6
Experiment 6: Mean Percentage Detection Rate and False
Alarm Rate and Mean d for Critical Stimulus Detection as a
Function of Working Memory Load
Working
memory
load
Detection
rate (%)
False alarm
rate (%) d
Low 91 11 3.13
High 89 10 3.11
1087 LOAD INDUCED BLINDNESScases both (e.g., De Fockert et al., 2001, used distractor faces that
were not only related to the task response—i.e., they were con-
gruent or incongruent with the target response—but were also
likely to have been more salient than the word targets).
The contrast between the effects of working memory load on
these different types of stimuli therefore suggests that active ex-
ecutive control of selective attention by working memory is
needed only in competitive situations: When stimuli irrelevant to
the search or discrimination task compete with the target for
selection, active executive control of selective attention is engaged
in order to prevent the selection of such stimuli. Hence, loading
working memory results in increased interference because execu-
tive control is no longer able to manage selective attention as
effectively. However, the processing of irrelevant stimuli that do
not compete with the target for selection is unaffected by working
memory load, because executive control processes are not required
to prevent them from causing interference in the first place.
This interpretation accommodates previous findings that the
neural activity related to task-irrelevant stimuli is affected by
perceptual load but not by working memory load (e.g., Yi et al.,
2004). In this study, the task-irrelevant stimuli (images of places
presented in the background) were unrelated to the task responses
concerning the identity of a face in the center of the display. As
such, they would not have competed with the target for selection
and active executive control would not have been required to
reduce the extent to which they were processed. Loading working
memory would therefore have no effect.
Finally, it is important to note that the manipulation of working
memory load via the active maintenance of digits in memory
employed here, as well as in the previous working memory load
and distractibility studies by Lavie and colleagues, would not have
involved any load on visual short-term memory, because active
maintenance of verbal material is mediated by phonological re-
hearsal (Conrad, 1964; Posner & Keele, 1967). Visual short-term
memory involves a passive form of maintenance that does not
draw on active executive control (Baddeley, 1986). Indeed, high
visual short-term memory load has recently been found to reduce
conscious awareness (Todd, Fougnie, & Marois, 2005). This find-
ing is in line with the notion that representations in visual short-
term memory are analogous to visual perception, leading to the
prediction that the effect of visual short-term memory load would
be similar to that of perceptual load.
General Discussion
Our experiments have demonstrated the effect of perceptual
load on conscious perception. High, compared with low, percep-
tual load in a letter search task consistently reduced participants’
ability to detect the presence of a shape stimulus presented in the
periphery that was unrelated to the search task. Moreover, the
effect of perceptual load was found on both measures of detection
accuracy (hit rates) and sensitivity (d) and was never accompa-
nied by an effect on response bias (). The effects of perceptual
load therefore indicate that participants were less likely to be
aware of the search-irrelevant stimulus when performing a search
task of high perceptual load—a phenomenon of load induced
blindness.
The results were replicated when RTs for low and high percep-
tual load search tasks did not differ (Experiment 2) and when the
detection response was made immediately upon stimulus presen-
tation, before the search response (Experiment 3). The results were
also unchanged when the priority of the detection task was raised
by increasing the frequency of CS presentation from 17% to 50%
and by requesting participants to make either a present or an absent
response so that a detection response had to be made on every trial
(Experiment 4). Furthermore, the effect of perceptual load per-
sisted with a design that rules out a strategy-based account of the
results in which high load and low load trials were randomly
intermixed within blocks (Experiment 5). The effect of perceptual
load on conscious perception was therefore not due to differences
in search task RTs, memory, strategy, or goal-neglect and depri-
oritization of the detection task, but was indeed specifically due to
load on perceptual processes.
The results provide the most compelling evidence so far in
support of the claim that the level of perceptual load in a task
determines the extent to which any additional task-irrelevant stim-
uli are consciously perceived. This claim is one of the central
tenets of load theory and is critical for the resolution load theory
proposes for the early and late selection debate. Previous tests of
the theory have not directly tested this prediction, however. As we
briefly reviewed in the introductory section, although perceptual
load theory has stimulated a great deal of behavioral and neuro-
imaging research, previous experiments have assessed perception
with popular but indirect measures such as distractor effects on
RTs and distractor-related neural activity. The only previous study
that directly assessed the effects of perceptual load on conscious
perception (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007) used the inatten-
tional blindness paradigm. The results of that study are therefore
confined to the case of unexpected stimuli and are open to alter-
native accounts in terms of potential effects of load on response
bias or memory.
Working Memory Load
Experiment 6 confirmed the specificity of the effect of percep-
tual load on conscious detection: Increasing working memory load
during performance of the search and detection task in Experiment
6 did not have an effect on detection rate or sensitivity. This
finding rules out an account of the effects of perceptual load in
terms of an increase in the demand on general cognitive capacity
resources. Furthermore, the contrast between our finding that
working memory load does not affect the perception of stimuli
unrelated to the search task, and those of previous studies (see also
footnote 2) showing that working memory load increases
distractor-related neural activity and interference effects on behav-
ior (De Fockert et al., 2001; Lavie, 2000; Lavie & De Fockert,
2005; Lavie et al., 2004), allows a more detailed understanding of
the role working memory serves in the control of selective atten-
tion: Only in situations in which distracting stimuli compete with
the target for selection will active executive control of selective
attention by working memory be needed to minimize distractor
interference effects. In such situations, rendering executive control
unavailable to the task by loading working memory results in
greater distractor processing. On the other hand, when task-
irrelevant stimuli do not compete with the target for response
selection, and therefore cannot produce interference, executive
control is not required and the processing of such stimuli is
1088 MACDONALD AND LAVIEunaffected by the level of load on executive control functions such
as working memory.
This account explains the apparent discrepancy between results
showing that working memory load determines the processing of
competing distractor stimuli (e.g., De Fockert et al., 2001; Lavie &
De Fockert, 2005; Lavie et al., 2004) and results showing that
working memory load does not affect the processing of task-
irrelevant stimuli (e.g., Yi et al., 2004). Whereas the positive
effects of working memory load were found in experiments using
salient, competing distractors, the null effects of working memory
load were found in experiments in which the task-irrelevant stimuli
did not compete with the target for selection.
Detection as a Capacity-Limited Process
Our finding that detection sensitivity to a stimulus unrelated to
the search task is reduced under conditions of high perceptual load
(while response bias is unchanged) suggests that even simple
presence/absence detection is subject to capacity limits and there-
fore depends on the allocation of attention.
Research into the question of the extent to which detection
depends on the allocation of attention or may instead be a capacity-
free process that is independent of attention has produced mixed
results. Studies that have used attentional cuing paradigms typi-
cally found effects of spatial cuing on detection RT (showing both
costs for unattended positions and benefits for attended positions;
e.g., Posner, 1980; Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980), and there-
fore suggested that detection depends on the allocation of atten-
tion. However, RT effects may simply reflect the adoption of a
more liberal response criterion at the cued location and hence
cannot directly inform about the role of attention in the perceptual
processes involved in detection.
Studies that can isolate the effects on detection accuracy from
those on response bias (e.g., using either the signal detection
method or two-alternative forced choices) can be more informative
in this regard. Unfortunately they have not produced consistent
results. A series of experiments by Graham and colleagues (e.g.,
Davis et al., 1983; Graham, Kramer, & Haber, 1985) reported no
effects of cuing on detection accuracy when two-interval forced
choices were measured. In contrast, some studies using signal
detection analysis have reported an enhancement of detection
sensitivity for cued, compared with uncued, locations, with no
effect on response bias (e.g., Bashinski & Bacharach, 1980; Brawn
& Snowden, 2000). Others, however, have found an effect of
attentional cuing on response bias alone, with no effect on detec-
tion sensitivity (e.g., Muller & Findlay, 1987), and others still have
found an effect on both detection sensitivity and response bias
(Downing, 1988; Hawkins et al., 1990; Luck et al., 1994; Muller
& Humphreys, 1991; Smith, 1998).
Experiments addressing whether detection is a capacity-limited
process by investigating the effect of the display set size have also
produced mixed results (contrast, for example, the results of
Palmer, 1990, with those of Palmer, Ames, & Lindsey, 1993). In
addition, many have suggested that the effects of spatial cuing or
display set size on detection sensitivity merely reflect reduced
noise with smaller set sizes or cued stimuli (e.g., Duncan, 1980;
Muller & Findlay, 1987; Muller & Humphreys, 1991; Pelli, 1985;
Shaw, 1982; Sperling, 1984; Sperling & Dosher, 1986).
Research using the dual-task method is more relevant to the
present study. However, this research has not reached a consensus
either. Bonnel, Stein, and Bertucci (1992) claimed that whereas a
perceptual discrimination (in their case between a luminance in-
crement and decrement) depends on the allocation of attention,
detection (of a luminance increment) is capacity free. However,
Bonnel and colleagues’ study compared the effects of instructions
to allocate attention differentially between two stimuli (e.g., 80%
to one source of light and 20% to another) and did not address the
effects of perceptual load on attention as we have. Somewhat more
relevant are the findings from experiments that assessed the effects
of attention on detection by comparing performance in single- and
dual-task conditions. In a series of studies, Braun and Sagi (1990,
1991; see also Sagi & Julesz, 1985a, 1985b) found that detection
of an oddball that forms a texture break in a homogenous back-
ground (a vertical line among tilted lines) did not show a perfor-
mance decrement under dual-task conditions (in which the detec-
tion task was combined with an orientation discrimination task).
When the detection task was replaced with a second discrimination
task, however, performance did suffer. Braun and Sagi (1990)
therefore concluded, similar to Bonnel et al. (1992), that whereas
perceptual discrimination depends on the allocation of attention,
detection of an element that forms a texture break does not. This
conclusion was contested, however, by Joseph, Chun, and Na-
kayama (1997), who replicated Braun and Sagi’s (1991) findings
(i.e., the lack of a detection performance decrement in dual-task
conditions) with a task involving detection of an oddball line (e.g.,
a line tilted at 45° among other lines tilted at 315°) and a central
task involving an orientation discrimination, but found that detec-
tion did suffer from a dual-task decrement when combined with a
demanding RSVP letter task rather than the orientation discrimi-
nation task. These results mirror our own, in that only a demanding
task of high perceptual load produced a decrement in detection
performance, supporting the conclusion that a greater demand on
attention can result in reduced conscious perception, in line with
perceptual load theory. The conclusion drawn from Joseph and
colleagues’ study, however, is confined to the comparison of
detection performance in single- and dual-task conditions. It is
important to note that such conditions differ not only in the level
of load on attention but also in terms of the logistics involved in
performing two tasks simultaneously. Such a comparison is there-
fore confounded by nonattentional processes such as making an
additional response per trial (in the dual-task condition), memory
(due to the delay caused by making one task response after the
other in the dual task condition), and goal neglect (due to perform-
ing two tasks simultaneously). By contrast, our experiments in-
volve a task that remains the same in all respects other than the
perceptual load of the search task and demonstrate that the level of
load on attention, as distinct from any effects of memory, goal
neglect, response bias, strategy, or task difficulty, can determine
perceptual sensitivity even for the simple ability to detect whether
a stimulus is present or absent.
As such, these results provide the most direct evidence in
support of the perceptual load hypothesis that conscious perception
(even mere detection of stimulus presence) depends on the allo-
cation of limited capacity attention and that exhausting attention in
a high perceptual load task eliminates conscious perception of
task-irrelevant stimuli, with the failures to detect the stimulus’s
presence leading participants to experience load induced blindness.
1089 LOAD INDUCED BLINDNESSReferences
Allport, A. (1993). Attention and control: Have we been asking the wrong
questions? A critical review of twenty-five years. In D. E. Meyer & S.
Kornblum (Ed.), Attention and performance XIV: Synergies in experi-
mental psychology, artificial intelligence, and cognitive neuroscience
(pp. 183–218). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Baddeley, A. D. (1986). Working memory. Oxford, England: Clarendon
Press.
Bahrami, B., Lavie, N., & Rees, G. (2007). Attentional load modulates
responses of human primary visual cortex to invisible stimuli. Current
Biology, 17, 509–513.
Barber, P. J., & Folkard, S. (1972). Reaction time under stimulus uncer-
tainty with response certainty. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 93,
138–142.
Bashinski, H. S., & Bacharach, V. R. (1980). Enhancement of perceptual
sensitivity as the result of selectively attending to spatial locations.
Perception & Psychophysics, 28, 241–248.
Beck, D. M., & Lavie, N. (2005). Look here but ignore what you see:
Effects of distractors at fixation. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Human Perception and Performance, 31, 592–607.
Bonnel, A. M., Stein, J. F., & Bertucci, P. (1992). Does attention modulate
the perception of luminance changes? The Quarterly Journal of Exper-
imental Psychology, 44A, 601–626.
Brand-D’Abrescia, M., & Lavie, N. (2007). Distractor effects during
processing of words under load. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14(6),
1153–1157.
Braun, J., & Sagi, D. (1990). Vision outside the focus of attention.
Perception & Psychophysics, 48, 45–58.
Braun, J., & Sagi, D. (1991). Texture-based tasks are little affected by
second tasks requiring peripheral or central attentive fixation. Percep-
tion, 20, 483–500.
Brawn, P. T., & Snowden, R. J. (2000). Attention to overlapping objects:
Detection and discrimination of orientation signals in visual search.
Vision Research, 40, 1293–1300.
Broadbent, D. E. (1958). Perception and communication. London: Perga-
mon.
Cartwright-Finch, U., & Lavie, N. (2007). The role of perceptual load in
inattentional blindness. Cognition, 102, 321–340.
Cherry, E. C. (1953). Some experiments on the recognition of speech with
one and with two ears. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 25,
975–979.
Conrad, R. (1964). Acoustic confusions in immediate memory. British
Journal of Psychology, 55, 75–84.
Corteen, R. S., & Dunn, D. (1974). Shock-associated words in a non-
attended message: A test for momentary awareness. Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology, 102, 1143–1144.
Davis, E. T., Kramer, P., & Graham, N. (1983). Uncertainty about spatial
frequency, spatial position, or contrast of visual patterns. Perception &
Psychophysics, 33, 20–28.
De Fockert, J. W., Rees, G., Frith, C. D., & Lavie, N. (2001). The role of
working memory in visual selective attention. Science, 291, 1803–1806.
Deutsch, J. A., & Deutsch, D. (1963). Attention: Some theoretical consid-
erations. Psychological Review, 70, 80–90.
Downing, C. J. (1988). Expectancy and visual spatial-attention: Effects on
perceptual quality. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Per-
ception and Performance, 14, 188–202.
Driver, J., & Tipper, S. P. (1989). On the nonselectivity of “selective”
seeing: Contrasts between interference and priming in selective atten-
tion. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Per-
formance, 15, 304–314.
Duncan, J. (1980). The locus of interference in the perception of simulta-
neous stimuli. Psychological Review, 87, 272–300.
Duncan, J., Emslie, H., Williams, P., Johnson, R., & Freer, C. (1996).
Intelligence and the frontal lobe: The organization of goal-directed
behavior. Cognitive Psychology, 30, 257–303.
Eriksen, B. A., & Eriksen, C. W. (1974). Effects of noise-letters on
identification of a target letter in a non-search task. Perception &
Psychophysics, 16, 143–149.
Eriksen, C. W., & Hoffman, J. E. (1972). Temporal and spatial character-
istics of selective encoding from visual displays. Perception & Psycho-
physics, 12, 201–204.
Gatti, S. W., & Egeth, H. (1978). Failure of spatial selectivity in vision.
Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 11, 181–184.
Graham, N., Kramer, P., & Haber, N. (1985). Attending to the spatial
frequency and spatial position of near-threshold visual patterns. In M. I.
Posner & O. S. M. Marin (Eds.), Mechanisms of attention: Attention and
performance XI (pp. 269–283). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Hawkins, H. L., Hillyard, S. A., Luck, S. I., Mouloua, M., Downing, C. J.,
& Woodward, D. P. (1990). Visual attention modulates signal detect-
ability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance, 16, 801–811.
Joseph, J. S., Chun, M. M., & Nakayama, K. (1997). Attentional require-
ments in a preattentive feature search task. Nature, 387, 805–808.
Lavie, N. (1995). Perceptual load as a necessary condition for selective
attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance, 21, 451–468.
Lavie, N. (2000). Selective attention and cognitive control: Dissociating
attentional functions through different types of load. In S. Monsell & J.
Driver (Eds.), Control of cognitive processes: Attention and perfor-
mance XVIII. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lavie, N. (2005). Distracted and confused?: Selective attention under load.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 75–82.
Lavie, N. (2006). Attention and consciousness. The Blackwell companion
to consciousness. Oxford, England: Blackwell.
Lavie, N., & Cox, S. (1997). On the efficiency of attentional selection:
Efficient visual search results in inefficient rejection of distraction.
Psychological Science, 8, 395–398.
Lavie, N., & De Fockert, J. W. (2003). Contrasting effects of sensory limits
and capacity limits in visual selective attention. Perception & Psycho-
physics, 65, 202–212.
Lavie, N., & De Fockert, J. W. (2005). The role of working memory in
attentional capture. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12, 669–674.
Lavie, N., & Fox, E. (2000). The role of perceptual load in negative
priming. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance, 26, 1038–1052.
Lavie, N., Hirst, A., De Fockert, J. W., & Viding, E. (2004). Load theory
of selective attention and cognitive control. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 133, 339–354.
Lavie, N., Ro, T., & Russell, C. (2003). The role of perceptual load in
processing distractor faces. Psychological Science, 14, 510–515.
Lavie, N., & Tsal, Y. (1994). Perceptual load as a major determinant of the
locus of selection in visual attention. Perception & Psychophysics, 56,
183–197.
Lewis, J. (1970). Semantic processing of unattended messages using di-
chotic listening. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 85, 225–228.
Luck, S. J., Hillyard, S. A., Mouloua, M., Woldorff, M. G., Clark, V. P.,
& Hawkins, H. L. (1994). Effects of spatial cuing on luminance detect-
ability: Psychophysical and electrophysiological evidence for early se-
lection. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance, 20, 887–904.
Macdonald, J. S. P. (2008). Load induced blindness. Unpublished doctoral
thesis, University College London, London, United Kingdom.
Moray, N. (1959). Attention in dichotic listening: Affective cues and the
influence of instructions. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology, 11, 56–60.
Muller, H. J., & Findlay, J. M. (1987). Sensitivity and criterion effects in
1090 MACDONALD AND LAVIEthe spatial cueing of attention. Perception & Psychophysics, 42, 383–
399.
Muller, H. J., & Humphreys, G. W. (1991). Luminance increment detec-
tion: Capacity limited or not? Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Human Perception and Performance, 17, 107–124.
Neisser, U., & Becklen, R. (1975). Selective looking: Attending to visually
specified events. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 480–494.
Norman, D. A. (1968). Toward a theory of memory and attention. Psy-
chological Review, 75, 522–536.
O’Connor, G. H., Fukui, M. M., Pinsk, M. A., & Kastner, S. (2002).
Attention modulates responses in the human lateral geniculate nucleus.
Nature Neuroscience, 5, 1203–1209.
Palmer, J. (1990). Attentional limits on the perception and memory of
visual information. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Per-
ception and Performance, 16, 332–350.
Palmer, J., Ames, C. T., & Lindsey, D. T. (1993). Measuring the effect of
attention on simple visual search. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Human Perception and Performance, 19, 108–130.
Pelli, D. (1985). Uncertainty explains many aspects of visual contrast
detection and discrimination. Journal of the Optical Society of America,
2A, 1508–1531.
Pinsk, M. A., Doniger, G. M., & Kastner, S. (2003). Push-pull mechanism
of selective attention in human extrastriate cortex. Journal of Neuro-
physiology, 92, 622–629.
Posner, M. I. (1980). Orienting of attention. The Quarterly Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 32, 3–25.
Posner, M. I., & Keele, S. W. (1967). Decay of visual information from a
single letter. Science, 158, 137–139.
Posner, M. I., Snyder, C. R. R., & Davidson, B. J. (1980). Attention and the
detection of signals. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 109,
160–174.
Rees, G., Frith, C. D., & Lavie, N. (1997). Modulating irrelevant motion
perception by varying attentional load in an unrelated task. Science, 278,
1616–1619.
Rock, I., & Gutman, D. (1981). The effect of inattention on form percep-
tion. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Per-
formance, 7, 275–285.
Sagi, D., & Julesz, B. (1985a). Detection and discrimination in visual
orientation. Perception, 14, 619–628.
Sagi, D., & Julesz, B. (1985b). “Where” and “what” in vision. Science,
228, 1217–1219.
Schwartz, S., Vuilleumier, P., Hutton, C., Maravita, A., Dolan, R. J., &
Driver, J. (2005). Attentional load and sensory competition in human
vision: Modulation of fMRI responses by load at fixation during task-
irrelevant stimulation in the peripheral visual field. Cerebral Cortex, 15,
770–786.
Shaw, M. L. (1982). Attending to multiple sources of information: 1. The
integration of information in decision making. Cognitive Psychology,
14, 353–409.
Smith, P. L. (1998). Attention and luminance detection: A quantitative
analysis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception &
Performance, 24, 105–133.
Sperling, G. (1984). A unified theory of attention and signal detection. In
R. Parasuraman & D. R. Davies (Eds.), Varieties of attention (pp.
103–181). London: Academic Press.
Sperling, G., & Dosher, B. A. (1986). Strategy and optimization in human
information processing. In K. Boff, L. Kaufman, & J. Thomas (Eds.),
Handbook of perception and performance (Vol. 1, pp. 2.1–2.65) New
York: Wiley.
Teichner, W. H., & Krebs, M. J. (1974). Laws of visual choice reaction
time. Psychological Review, 81, 75–98.
Theeuwes, J., Kramer, A. F., & Belopolsky, A. (2004). Attentional set
interacts with perceptual load in visual search. Psychonomic Bulletin &
Review, 11, 697–702.
Tipper, S. P. (1985). The negative priming effect: Inhibitory effects of
ignored primes. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology,
37A, 571–590.
Todd, J. J., Fougnie, D., & Marois, R. (2005). Visual short-term memory
load suppresses temporo-parietal junction activity and induces inatten-
tional blindness. Psychological Science, 16, 965–972.
Treisman, A. (1960). Contextual cues in selective listening. The Quarterly
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 12, 242–248.
Treisman, A. (1969). Strategies and models of selective attention. Psycho-
logical Review, 76, 282–299.
Treisman, A., & Geffen, G. (1967). Selective attention: Perception or
response? The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 19, 1–18.
Treisman, A., & Riley, J. (1969). Is selective attention selective perception
or selective response? A further test. Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy, 79, 27–34.
Wolfe, J. M. (1999). Inattentional amnesia. In V. Coltheart (Ed.), Fleeting
memories: Cognition of brief visual stimuli (pp. 71–94). Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Yantis, S., & Johnston, J. C. (1990). On the locus of visual selection:
Evidence from focused attention tasks. Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology: Human Perception and Performance, 16, 135–149.
Yi, D.-J., Woodman, G. F., Widders, D., Marois, R., & Chun, M. M.
(2004). Neural fate of ignored stimuli: Dissociable effects of perceptual
and working memory load. Nature Neuroscience, 7, 992–996.
Received June 27, 2006
Revision received December 19, 2007
Accepted January 15, 2008 
1091 LOAD INDUCED BLINDNESS